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potheses whose confirmation will be
based on RDoC matrices?
And the RDoC approach, if under-
stood in this way, also raises the ques-
tion of the best way to satisfy Jaspers’
requirement that we should not only
describe but also try to understand and
interpret the meaning of the compo-
nents of psychopathology in their so-
cial, biological and psychological con-
text. The study of dimensions and their
measurement are only the beginning of
the process of approaching the creation
of meaningful prototypes correspond-
ing to individuals in their context. It is
to be hoped that the RDoC project has
foreseen a way to do this, starting with it
in parallel to the acquisition of data
about the research domains.
Another issue that should be kept in
mind is the emphasis on the collection
of data concerning the domains that
have been defined on the basis of a con-
sensus of a limited number of experts
who met in 2009. The consensus which
they reached directed the work of five
workshops that followed the first meet-
ing in order to define the dimensions to
be included in the domain, provide def-
initions of these dimensions and specify
elements that could be used to charac-
terize eachdimension. It ispossible that
another group of experts would have
selected another set of domains which
would have oriented the research into
another direction. This is particularly
true for the domain of “systems for
social processes” but also holds, possi-
bly to a lesser degree, for the domains of
“positive valence systems” and “neg-
ative valence systems”. The workshop
participants also “nominated and vet-
ted” the various classes of measure-
ment. There is nothing basically wrong
with this approach, unless working
along those lines uses all the available
resources and the approach becomes
the dominant theme for the National
Institute of Mental Health, which has
beensucha very importantplayer in the
governance of research and its orienta-
tion not only in the USA but also glob-
ally. Another group might perhaps
choose a different set of domains, con-
taining a different set of dimensions,
possibly more helpful: there should be
room and support for such a project. It
will therefore be important to remem-
ber that the basic premise of the RDoC
project is the consensus of a relatively
small group of experts about the area
that should be explored.
A third important issue which is not
explicitly addressed in the fine paper
that Cuthbert has written is that of mea-
suring the development of the units of
analysis over time. Physiological indi-
cators related to “acute threat” and any
other dimension included in the RDoC
change over time, and the longitudinal
profile of this change might be just as
revealing as its correlation with other
factors and characteristics of the indi-
vidual. To capture the impact of these
factors, it would probably be useful to
construct a three-dimensional matrix
involving domains, manners of investi-
gation, and age, gender and other char-
acteristics of the persons whose dimen-
sions are being measured, all of this
along the axis of time and longitudinal
development of the phenomenon.
The same argument applies, in a
slightly different form, to the decision
to avoid funding research that will be
based on DSM or ICD diagnostic cate-
gories. Research using categories creat-
ed on the basis of observations of be-
havior and the development of the dis-
order over time is as justified as other
approaches.Diagnosticcategorieshave
neverbeenmore thanhypothesesabout
the nature of the disorder that medical
practitioners meet. These hypotheses
should continue to be explored and
theirdefinitionsshouldcontinuechang-
ing over time and in the light of infor-
mation about the reaction of the disor-
ders to treatment, about long-term out-
come, about brain structures and func-
tions recorded by modern means.
In summary, we should congratulate
the National Institute of Mental Health
and thank it for deciding to fund work
proceeding along a well-defined new
avenue of research, hoping at the same
time that this departure will not block
the funding ofalternativewaysof exam-
ining human behavior and its basis in
health and in disease.
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Muchattentionhasbeenpaidtorevi-
sions of psychiatric classification sys-
tems. Nevertheless, there remains sig-
nificant dissatisfaction with the nosol-
ogy. From a neuroscience perspective,
diagnostic criteria have failed to incor-
porate neurobiological data, and a fo-
cus on “circuit-based behavioral di-
mensions” (1) will improve diagnosis.
From a more critical perspective, given
that psychiatric disorders do not repre-
sent valid disease entities (1), diagnosis
merely medicalizes problems in living.
These specific debates echo larger
debates about classification in medi-
cine, in which many emphasize notions
of disease, arguing that clinicians must
51
be scientists who understand physiolo-
gy, while others emphasize the experi-
ence of illness, stating that clinicians
mustbehumanistswhounderstandsuf-
fering (2). An integrative medicine and
psychiatry arguably recognizes each of
these aspects of being a good diagnosti-
cian and researcher (3,4).
From an integrative perspective, on-
going work on nosological systems is
needed to optimize diagnostic validity
and utility. To the extent that the RDoC
framework leads to research thatallows
such progress, it should be supported.
However, I worry that many DSM-5
and ICD-11 critics may have unduly
highexpectationsofdiagnosticsystems.
Insofar as the RDoC framework sets
unrealistic goals for nosology, caution
is needed. Along these lines, I would
emphasize the following points.
First, a clear goal of medical and psy-
chiatric classification is clinical utility,
which is only partly related to underly-
ing pathophysiology. In medicine, the
diagnosisofasyndrome,suchascardiac
failure, may provide little information
about precise etiology, but nevertheless
mayhelpguide treatment (5). In psychi-
atry,manyentitiesaresyndromic.While
syndromes may have multiple causes,
blurry boundaries, and absent bio-
markers, they also are clinically useful.
It may be counterargued that much
of medicine focuses on specific etiolog-
ically-based entities, e.g., viral pneumo-
nia.Psychiatry too has specific diseases,
such as psychosis due to neurosyphilis.
But these exceptions prove the rule;
many diagnoses in medicine and psy-
chiatry reflect the fact that patients pre-
sent with variegate symptoms under-
pinned by multiple mechanisms (6).
Some cases of hypertension, headache,
and depression are due to single gene
variants or other circumscribed patho-
physiologies; the majority reflect multi-
ple influences.
Second, given that multiple mecha-
nisms play a role in producing psychi-
atric signs and symptoms, foreground-
ing any particular diagnostic validator,
such as “circuit-based behavioral di-
mensions”, has both pros and cons. Sci-
ence has progressed from Hippocrat-
es’s account of the “humors” to theories
of the neurocircuitry basis of positive
and negative valence, but it is possible
that, a century from now, circuitry con-
cepts will be considered rudimentary.
On the other hand, the construct of
depression, which is based on several
other validators, may continue to reso-
nate with eons of clinical descriptions.
DSM-5 distinguishes between anxi-
ety and obsessive-compulsive related
disorders partly on the basis of the dif-
ferent neurocircuitry underpinning
these conditions. But there are also
strong arguments for lumping these dis-
orders on the basis of considerations
such as response to serotonin reuptake
inhibitors and cognitive-behavioural
treatments (7). We need to accept that
diagnosticsystemscannot“carvenature
at her joints”. Rather, facts and values
needtobecontinually re-assessed, totry
optimize classifications.
Third, given the multiple mechanisms
underlying psychiatric complaints, and
the many considerations relevant to
treatment decisions, we should be cau-
tious in our expectation that diagnostic
criteria or thresholds will ultimately be
based on behavioral dimensions or bio-
logical markers. Simple assessments,
such as blood pressure measurement
or mental status examination in medi-
cineandpsychiatry, can provide impor-
tant information. Still, such informa-
tion is partial. In medicine and psychi-
atry, deciding on whether and how to
intervene necessarily requires a com-
plex assessment of a range of factors,
including understanding the function
of symptoms, their social context, and
the risks versus benefits of treatment.
One set of factors sometimes ne-
glected by critics of nosology emerges
from a public health perspective. Psy-
chiatric classifications focus on indi-
vidual disorders, where underlying
“endophenotypes” may be relevant.
However, it may be as important to
address “exophenotypes”, i.e., societal
phenomena, such as interpersonal vio-
lence, that crucially contribute to the
burden of disease (8). Furthermore,
decisions about thresholds for psychi-
atric intervention may need to include
not only facts about underlying neuro-
biologicalmechanisms,butalsoconsid-
erations such as the cost-effectiveness
of particular interventions.
Given that the RDoC framework
encourages research on a broad range
of phenomena and mechanisms, it is
hard to be overly critical. By adopting
a translational approach that encom-
passes different levels of investigation,
RDoC may well contribute to advanc-
ing personalized medicine. Still, we
need to be cautious of medical straw-
men, such as the physician who relies
solely on laboratory tests to determine
diagnoses, or the public health practi-
tioner who eradicates pathogens using
simple interventions such as hand-
washing. No matter how many dollars
we pour into behavioral neuroscience,
we may have to accept that there are
few diagnostic biomarkers for psychiat-
ric disorders, and few mosquito nets to
combat them (9).
Indeed, given the complexity ofmed-
icine, psychiatry provides a number of
approaches worth emulating. Thus, a
physician faced with a patient with
headache should be able, after a careful
history and examination, to diagnose a
particular headache syndrome (indeed,
headache classification takes a DSM-
likeapproach(10)).Then,basedonneu-
roscience knowledge, as well as a range
of other considerations, one or another
intervention may be chosen. Similarly, a
physician faced with a complex public
health problem, such as substance
abuse, knows that the causes are com-
plex, that a range of responses are need-
ed (and that, as in much of psychiatry,
there is no mosquito net).
For the foreseeable future, an inte-
grative approach to psychiatric diagno-
sis and research ought to incorporate
DSM/ICD, RDoC, and a broad range
of other constructs.
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For the past 35 years, clinicians and
researchers in the United States have
utilized essentially the same diagnostic
system for the purposes of describing
patients’ symptomatic presentations.
Having common diagnostic defini-
tions for both research and clinical
practice has had a number of advan-
tages. It has made possible the transfer
of information between the ever grow-
ing clinical research literature and clin-
ical practice. Because the same criteria
are used for diagnosing patients in both
settings, it is easier to translate findings
of a research paper to the diagnosis and
treatment of the next patient that one
might see in an office practice. This
approach also ensures greater clarity
of communication within and among
areas of psychiatric practice. Most im-
portantly, this approach facilitates the
necessary dialogue and mutual influ-
ence between clinicians and research-
ers.
Recognizing the value of operation-
alized diagnostic criteria for facilitating
communication among clinicians and
researchers and improving the reliabil-
ity of diagnostic assessment, in 1980
the American Psychiatric Association
adopted diagnostic criteria as the cen-
terpiece of the DSM-III classification.
The expectation was that, in addition to
improving clinical assessment, they
would be widely adopted by the re-
search community.
Subsequently,mostof thepsychiatric
research literature since DSM-III has
been keyed to DSM categories, thus
facilitating its application to clinical
practice. The hope was that iterative
refinement of the diagnostic criteria
sets through successive validation stud-
ies would eventually elucidate their
underlying etiologies (1,2). However,
despite years of intensive investigation,
researchers using the current DSM par-
adigm have “failed to identify a single
neurobiological phenotypic marker or
gene that is useful in making a diagnosis
of a major psychiatric disorder” (3, p.
33). While much of this lack of success
reflects the enormous complexity and
relative inaccessibility of the human
brain (4), undoubtedly a major contrib-
utor is the fact that the DSM categories
are a poor mirror of nature.
Although it has become increasingly
evident to researchers over the past 20
years that the DSM categories do not
represent valid disease entities, the
entrenched hegemony of the DSM sys-
tem and the conservative nature of re-
view processes has led to researchers
being pressured to use the DSM-IV cat-
egories “in order to satisfy most grant-
making bodies, journal reviewers and
editors, and organizers of scientific
meetings” (5, p. 156).
One of the main goals of the Nation-
alinstituteofMentalHealth’sRDoCproj-
ect is to release the research community
from the shackles of the DSM/ICD cate-
gorical systembyprovidinganalternative
framework for conducting research in
terms of fundamental circuit-based
behavior dimensions. Given its role as
the premier governmental body fund-
ing psychiatric research in the United
States, theNIMHisuniquelypositioned
to incentivize researchers to adopt such
a framework and thus it is likely that
most NIMH-funded research over the
nextdecadewilladopt theRDoCframe-
work.
While this has the potential to be a
positivestepthat facilitates thedevelop-
ment of the requisite research literature
“to attain groundbreaking nosological
approaches in the future that are based
upon genetics, other aspects of neuro-
biology, and behavioral science” (6), it
has the potential drawback of impeding
clinicians’ ability to make clinical sense
of such research and apply it to their
patients, whose clinical presentations
will likely continue for the foreseeable
future to be thought of in terms of the
DSM/ICD-type categories.
Indeed, one of the central thrusts of
RDoC is to discourage the use of the
DSM/ICD syndromal constructs by
researchers in either research design
or subject selection, except insofar as is
necessaryduringtheresearchcommun-
ity’s “transition” from the DSM/ICD to
RDoC. As noted by Cuthbert, many if
not most of the symptoms that form the
basis for DSM psychiatric assessment
and treatment do not appear in the
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